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Introduction
When I arrived at the Detroit Airport on my way to the symposium
"Milo~evit and Hussein on Trial" at Cornell, I joined the line as all other
visitors, shuffling on to the counter and showing my Dutch passport to the
Homeland Security officer. He checked it, as well as my flight tickets,
noticed the connecting flight to Syracuse, and asked me the purpose of my
visit. I told him I was on my way to a symposium at Cornell. "About
what?" he asked, and-almost routinely-I responded: "On international
criminal law." Then he took me by surprise by asking, "Are you for or
against it?" The question puzzled me for a moment: should I interpret it as
the way the ordinary American perceives the issue, or should I simply
ignore my own perception of the situation? I decided to answer, "It is just
another area of law, isn't it? It doesn't matter were you live." The officer
seemed satisfied, I passed through, and arrived in the United States.
Traditionally, politicians, officials, and national leaders have not been
held responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
Although the idea of accountability for violations of international humani-
tarian law began to take hold at the beginning of the last century, it was
only sixty years ago that the first top military and civilian leaders were
brought to trial. These crimes are usually referred to as "international
t Defense Counsel at Wladimiroff & Waling N.V., Attorneys at Law in The Hague,
The Netherlands; Professor of Law (Economic Criminal Law) 1986-1997 University
Utrecht, The Netherlands; J.D. 1972 University Leiden, The Netherlands. A summary of
parts of this paper was presented at the Cornell International Law Journal 2005
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crimes," in contrast with those acts regulated by domestic law. This article
explores the development of accountability for violations of international
humanitarian law for former heads of states and other national leaders,
with a focus on Slobodan Milogevit and Saddam Hussein, and discusses a
number of issues that arise in the trial process, on the basis of my exper-
iences1 in a number of such proceedings.
I. The Courts
Violations of international humanitarian law are prosecuted before a
variety of tribunals: some are more or less of a domestic nature, while
others are international or internationalized courts.
Domestic courts are a part of a state's legal system, and are usually
established by parliamentary legislation, sometimes on the basis of
extraordinary powers. Domestic courts obviously have jurisdiction over
crimes committed within their own territory, which, in many cases,
extends to jurisdiction over matters that implicate the state's nationals, or
relevant national interests. For some crimes, such as violations of interna-
tional law, domestic courts may exercise universal jurisdiction. 2 In the
Pinochet case, for example, an investigative magistrate of a Spanish domes-
tic court exercised universal jurisdiction by requesting the extradition of
General Augusto Pinochet, the former head of state of Chile, from the
United Kingdom to Spain.
3
Besides ordinary national courts, there are special courts to try viola-
tions of international humanitarian law, such as international courts, and
courts of a hybrid nature, including special domestic courts. These courts
differ both in their jurisdiction and the applicable law. The "pilot" courts
for the application of international humanitarian law are the military tribu-
nals of Nuremberg and Tokyo-the first international courts that tried indi-
viduals for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
4
A. Special Courts
The Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), which will try Saddam Hussein, is an
example of a domestic court sui generis. It was established by the Coalition
Provisional Authority, and has competence ratione personae to prosecute
Iraqi nationals, and residents of Iraq accused of international crimes and
1. In 1995-1997, 1 was Defense Counsel of the first defendant, Dugko Tadic, before
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); in 1999-2000 1
defended Alfred Musema before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR);
in 2001 and 2002 1 participated in the Milogevit trial before the ICTY as one of the
amici curiae. In 2003, 1 acted on behalf of the Republic of Liberia before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice to challenge the indictment of President Charles Taylor by the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. In 2004 and 2005, I was involved in training programs
for the Iraqi judiciary, including the Iraqi Special Court, which will try Saddam Hussein.
2. Belgium courts had a unique universal jurisdiction over international crimes
that attracted complaints against (former) foreign officials. It was limited to the usual
criteria for competence after diplomatic pressure.
3. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
4. Both tribunals were also competent to try crimes against the peace.
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some specific national offences. Common domestic courts seldom have a
limited temporal jurisdiction; special courts, however, may be endowed
with a competence ratione temporis that is limited to a specific timeframe,
usually related to a troublesome period of time in that country.
In 1992, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 808,5 stating
that "an international tribunal shall be established for the Prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."6 This
new court-the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)-became the first international criminal court since the military
tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo. 7 The ICTY is an ad hoc court with
territorial jurisdiction limited to the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and
temporal jurisdiction limited to those violations committed after 1991, and
continuing until the Security Council decides otherwise.8 In 1994, the
Security Council established a second international criminal court in
response to mass atrocities in Rwanda. 9 The court's purpose is the
"prosecutlion] of persons responsible for genocide and other serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for the crimes [just mentioned]
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January and
31 December 1994."0 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) is-comparable to the ICTY-an ad hoc court with limited territo-
rial and temporal jurisdiction.1 1 On 17 July 1998, another international
court was created at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference in Rome.
The vast majority of the State parties to the conference signed the treaty to
establish the International Criminal Court (ICC). 12 The ICC has a comple-
5. S.C. Res. 808, 9 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993).
6. The Statute was adopted by Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 and amended by
Resolutions 1166 of 13 May 1998, 1329 of 30 November 2000 and 1411 of 17 May
2002. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 13, 1998); S.C. Res. 1166, U.N.Doc. S/
RES/1166 (May 13, 1998); S.C. Res. 14111, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411 (May 17, 2002).
7. See, e.g., Ed Vulliamy, In Times of Trial, THE GuARDLAN (London), Oct. 31, 1995,
at T6.
8. In 2002, both the ICTY and the ICTR endorsed a strategy for completing investi-
gations by the end of 2004, all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008 and all
of its work in 2010. The President of the Security Council, Statement, 911 1, 3-4, deliv-
ered to the Security Council, U.N Doc. S/PRST/2002/21 (July 23, 2002). Security Coun-
cil Resolutions 1503 of 28 August 2003 and 1534 of 26 March 2004 affirmed the
Completion Strategies. S.C. Res. 1503, pmbl., 9 7, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28,
2003); S.C. Res. 1534, pmbl., 99[ 3-6, U.N.Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
9. S.C. Res. 935, 9 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (July 1, 1994).
10. S.C. Res. 955, 9l 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
11. The Statute was adopted by Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994 and amended
by Resolution 1165 of 30 April 1998, Resolution 1329 of 30 November 2000 and Reso-
lution 1411 of 17 May 2002. Id.; S.C. Res. 1165, U.N. Doc. S/RES/91165 (Apr. 30,
1998); S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (Dec. 5, 2000); S.C. Res. 1411, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1411 (May 17, 2002).
12. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5, 12, 13, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [herein-
after Rome Statute]. According to article 126 of the Rome Statute, the Statute "enter[s]
into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of deposit of
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mentary 13 jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, 14 when committed by nationals of a state party, or within the terri-
tory of a state party 15 after 1 July 2002. In contrast with the ad hoc courts,
the ICC is a permanent court, established by a multilateral treaty, and sup-
ported by the United Nations.
More recently, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1315 to
address the massive and widespread violence caused by the civil war in
Sierra Leone. Resolution 131516 requested that the Secretary-General
negotiate an agreement with the government of Sierra Leone to create an
independent special court. In 2002, the agreement to establish the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was signed, and Sierra Leone subsequently
implemented the agreement via domestic legislation, effective 2002.17 The
SCSL is mandated to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law, and specific Sierra
Leonean laws, committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 Novem-
ber 1996. The court has limited territorial jurisdiction and its rationae
temporis is limited from above mentioned date to a future date to be
decided by a subsequent agreement between the parties. According to its
rationae personae, emphasis is placed on those who bear the greatest
responsibility for international crimes. The SCSL is another ad hoc court
of an internationalized character as it has both national and international
judges.
The violent events leading to the independence of the island of East
Timor after the occupation by Indonesia led to Security Council Resolution
1272, which established a transitional administration in East Timor
the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations." Id. art. 126. On 11 April 2002, sixty such instruments
were deposited.
13. The ICC may only exercise its jurisdiction when states (or the Security Council)
refer cases to the court or when state parties are unwilling or unable to prosecute accord-
ing to article 17. Id. art. 17.
14. Id. art. 5(1)(a-d). Besides these core crimes, "[tihe 1lCC] shall exercise a [dor-
mant] jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accor-
dance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under
which the court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime." Id. art. 5(2).
15. Id. art. 12(2)(a). The competence of the ICC may be extended in cases where
states have accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC, id. art. 12(3), when the case is referred
to the prosecutor by a state party or the Security Council, id. art.13(a-b), or where the
defendant was tried by another court, but the proceedings were intended to shield the
defendant, or were otherwise inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned
to justice." Id. art. 20.
16. S.C. Res. 1315, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
17. The agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
was signed on 16 January 2002. Agreement between the United Nations and the Gov-
ernment of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, app.
II, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246. The domestic implementing legislation was
passed on 19 March 2002 and assented to by the President of Sierra Leone on 29 March
2002. Special Court Agreement, 2002 (Ratification Act), reprinted in CXXXIII SIEA
LEONE GAZETTE No. 22, at 2 (supp. Apr. 25, 2002), available at http://www.sierra-leone.
org/gazette.html. On 16 April 2002, Sierra Leone and the United Nations exchanged
the instruments that brought the Agreement into force.
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(UNTAET). i8 This administration instituted another type of an interna-
tionalized court: the Special Panels for Serious Crimes.19 These panels,
composed of national and international judges, are a part of the domestic
District Court in Dili, the capital of East Timor. The panels have exclusive
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and some
specific domestic crimes committed in East Timor between 1 January and
25 October 1999.20 A remarkable feature of these panels is the application
"avant la lettre" of the substantive law taken verbatim from the Statute of
the International Criminal Court.
The internationalized Kosovo courts are another variation. These
courts were established under the United Nations Interim Administration
scheme in Kosovo (UNMIK), 2 1 with a competence including international
crimes. Panels consisting of a mixture of Kosovan and international judges
operate within the Kosovan legal system, 22 and hear cases arising from the
internal conflict in the province of Kosovo between the Kosovan Albanians
and the Serbs. The competences of the Kosovan panels do not, however,
limit the ICTY's primary jurisdiction over international crimes related to
the conflict in Kosovo. Finally, an internationalized extraordinary cham-
ber may be established in the courts of Cambodia, with jurisdiction over
international and other specific crimes committed by senior members of
the Khmer Rouge regime in the period between 17 April 1975 and 6 Janu-
ary 1979.23
18. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
19. Resolution 1272 mandated UNTAET to bring to justice those responsible for the
violence surrounding the referendum (that led to independence). Id. art. 16. The Spe-
cial Panels were established by UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 of 6 June 2000. UNTAET
Reg. No. 2000/15, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000).
20. Parallel to this development, the Indonesian authorities established a tribunal to
try cases arising from human rights violations in East Timor as an ad hoc part of the
Jakarta District Court on 23 April 2001.
21. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (establishing the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)).
22. UNMIK Regulations 2000/24, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/24 (Apr. 21,
2000), and 2000/59, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/59 (Oct. 27, 2000) complemented
the Kosovan Criminal Code and the applicable criminal code of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia with internationally recognized human rights standards.
23. The applicable Cambodian regulations became law on 10 August 2001. Law on
the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Aug.
10, 2001, available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/KR%20Law%20as%20
promulgated%20(Eng% 2Otrans%206%2OSept%202001).pdf (English translation). It
seems that the discussions between the United Nations and the Cambodian Government
to secure the participation of international judges and the applicability of certain legal
standards and safeguards have been resolved. Agreement Between the United Nations
and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian
Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Oct. 19, 2004.
available at http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/Agreement%20between%20UN%20
and%20RGC.pdf.
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B. Personal Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the courts discussed above is limited to individu-
als; they may not try states, nor their organizational organs or other legal
entities. In classic international law, the general thrust of state responsibil-
ity is based on the establishment of impunity of the state for certain
wrongs committed by its agents or organs. The first codifications of cus-
tomary international law embodied the principle that the state, rather than
the individual, is responsible for breaches of the law and customs of war.
Subsequently, the focus of accountability for offences during an armed
conflict shifted step by step to individuals and their role with respect to the
offences. This shift resulted in the norm that all individuals are accounta-
ble for violations of humanitarian law, if committed or otherwise instituted
or permitted by themselves or by others for whom they are responsible.
Modern individual criminal responsibility in international law
includes both factual (individual) and functional responsibility. The com-
mon notion of individual responsibility takes as a starting point that a nor-
mal person is responsible for his own actions. Once individual
responsibility is acknowledged under international law, the same notion is
applied: a person, who participates in the planning, preparation or execu-
tion, or otherwise contributes to the commission of serious violations of
international humanitarian law, should be held criminally responsible.
And, indeed, the Nuremberg and Tokyo rulings 24 imposed responsibility
upon individuals, in their personal capacity, for his involvement in the
commission of human rights violations. As individual responsibility for
common offences came to include accountability for functional responsi-
bilities, the concept of criminal responsibility under international law
expanded in the same way. Commanders and superiors are treated as per-
petrators and accomplices when they have incited, allowed or failed to pre-
vent crimes committed in the line of duty by their subordinates.
All special courts provide for different levels of individual criminal
responsibility. In addition, heads of states, government officials, political
leaders and (high-ranking) military leaders are held accountable for acts
committed by lower ranking military and other persons acting under their
orders or directions or for events influenced through their position of supe-
rior authority or failure to prevent such acts.
II. Functional Responsibility
The first recorded trial to hold a commander criminally responsible
for murder and plunder by his troops dates back to 1474, when Peter von
Hagenbach appeared before a tribunal of the Holy Roman Empire. 25 An
early academic comment on command responsibility was made by the
24. ROBERT K. WOTZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 19-20 (rev.
ed., 1962).
25. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. I, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS (1968).
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great Dutch scholar Grotius, 2 6 who asserted that rulers might be held
responsible for the crime of a subject if they knew it and did not prevent iL
when they had the opportunity to do so. During the same period, King
Gustav of Sweden promulgated his "Articles of Military Lawwes to be
Observed in the Warres," 27 which provided that "[n]o Colonel or Captaine
shall command his souldiers to do any unlawful thing; which who so does,
shall be punished .... ." More such documents were issued in European
countries. In the United States, Articles of War were in enacted in 1775,
outlining the duties of military commanders during an armed conflict;
these were followed in the nineteenth century by the famous Lieber Code of
1863.28 In Europe, the Brussels Declaration of 1874,29 and the Oxford
Manual of the Laws and Customs of War of 1880,30 formed the basis of the
first and rudimentary Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War by the turn of the century.
In the twentieth century, the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War and annexed Regulations provided more clearly
the conditions that a combatant must fulfill to be accorded the rights of a
lawful belligerent. The Hague Convention provides that a person responsi-
ble for his subordinates must command the armed forces of each state
party. The responsibility of individuals, though limited to the military, was
affirmed after World War I: for example, the Treaty of Versailles 3 1 with
regard to Germany, called for the trial of the Kaiser, the Supreme German
Commander. That treaty provided, more generally, for the right of the
Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons
accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of
war. However, no such military tribunals were formed and no accused
individuals were prosecuted. The Treaty of Svres32 may also be men-
26. HUGO GROTIUS, DEJURE BELLI AC PACIS 523 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon
Press 1925).
27. William Hays Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REv. 1, 5
(1973) (quoting article 46 of King Gustav's articles).
28. Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United
States in the Field, promulgated as Gen. Order No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863) (Lieber Code),
reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Tomas eds., 3d
ed. 1988) (providing for punishment of a commander who ordered or encouraged the
intentional wounding or killing of a "wholly disabled enemy" whether he was in the
"Army of United States, or is an enemy captured after having committed his misdeed."
Id. art. 71.
29. Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of
War, Aug. 27, 1874, 65 Brit. Foreign & St. Papers 1005 (1873-74).
30. INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND (adopted by the
Institute of International Law at Oxford, Sept. 9, 1880).
31. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty
of Versailles) arts. 227-28, June 28, 1919, 225 CONSOL. T.S. 188, 285, reproduced in 13
Am. J. INT'L L. No. 3. Supp.: Official Documents, 151 (July 1919) (demanding the trial of
the Kaiser before an international tribunal, as well as demanding the trial of individuals
who had violated the laws of war before international military tribunals).
32. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey (Treaty of
Svres) art. 215(3), Aug. 10, 1920, 15 AM. J. INTL. L. 179, 231 (Supp 1921) (never rati-
fied, superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne) ("The Turkish government undertakes ...
[t]o facilitate the establishing of criminal acts punishable by the penalties referred to in
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tioned as it dealt, inter alia, with the responsibility of the "Young Turks" for
the Armenian genocide. Again no trials were instituted.
Issues of functional responsibility-including that of civilians-were
plentiful in the post-World War II prosecutions before the international
military tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo. The Nuremberg Charter
33
made it utterly clear that the official position of an accused-be it com-
mander or public official-would not exculpate an accused from responsi-
bility for crimes under the Charter. For opportunistic reasons,3 4 the Tokyo
Charter35 did not include heads of states. A broad scope of individual
criminal responsibility was then incorporated into the Nuremberg Princi-
ples, which were prepared by the International Law Commission and
affirmed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1950.36 The
principles were, in part, the inspiration for the statutes of the ICTY and the
ICTR and for the statutory provisions of the ICC. The principles also
played a role in national prosecutions-including those in the United
States-for the My Lai killing during the Vietnam war;3 7 in Israel when the
Kahan Commission 38 investigated the invasion in Lebanon which led to
massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps, Sabra and Shatilla; in Ger-
many, in the case of Honneker, 3 9 and his successor Krenz;40 and the
Pinochet extradition case4 t in the United Kingdom.
A. Command Responsibility
The applicable test for military commanders is that of culpability.
National courts have set a number of tests, ranging from a failure to act to
prevent the unlawful activity when the military commander "could have
Part VII (Penalties) of the present Treaty and committed by Turks against the persons of
prisoners of war or Allied nationals during the war.").
33. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis (Charter of the International Military Tribunal) arts. 6-7, Aug. 8,
1946, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
34. The Allied Forces yielded to the United States' insistence that Emperor Hirohito
not be tried. See RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTORS' JUSTICE: THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL
110-17 (1971); see generally JAMES WEBB, THE EMPEROR'S GENERAL (1999).
35. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art 6, Jan. 19,
1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (1968).
36. G.A. Res. 488 (V), U.N. GAOR, 320th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 12, 1950).
37. See Douglas 0. Linder, Famous Trials: An Introduction to the My Lai Court-Mar-
tial (2005), http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mylai/mylai.htm.
38. Linda A. Malone, Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon and the Sabra-Shatilla Massacres in
Lebanon: Responsibility Under International Law for Massacres of Civilian Populations,
1985 UTAH L. REv. 373-374 (1985).
39. The trial of Honneker before the court of Moabit was stayed in 1992 because of
the Defendant's unfitness to stand trial. Honneker died in Chile in 1994.
40. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 8, 1999 45 BGHSt 270
(FRG) [Judgment]; afrd on appeal, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Consti-
tutional Court] Jan. 12, 2000, 2000 NJW 443 (FRG). Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v.
Germany, Judgment, 2001-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 230 (March 22, 2001).
41. R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, t2000] 1
A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998) (Pinochet I); R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999) (Pinochet II); R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipen-
diary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999) (Pinochet III).
Vol. 38
2005 Former Heads of State on Trial
known," to those that require "actual knowledge." As an exception to the
general standard, the international doctrine recognizes functional responsi-
bility of military commanders by drawing the line where the commander
"should have known"4 2 of the unlawful activity. This is clearly culpability
based on negligence and not on culpa in causa. The military commander
has a duty to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his power
to prevent the commission of an unlawful act by subordinates under his
command, and he also has an additional obligation to take all necessary
and reasonable steps to keep himself sufficiently informed in order to be
reasonably able to prevent unlawful acts of his subordinates. The Germans
call this the principle of functional caution-"Garantenstellung"43 -as a
superior has to warrant for the proper performance of his men, and should
therefore do everything reasonable to make that possible. The statutes of
the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, take the matter further by including culpability
when a superior fails to take necessary and reasonable measures to punish
perpetrators or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for inves-
tigation and prosecution.4 4 Here, the same test deriving from the
Garantenstellung applies: The commander must take all necessary and rea-
sonable measures within his power to repress the commission of unlawful
acts.
Military standards should be high because of the need to preserve a
standard of discipline in a military structure, which is concomitant with
the superior's responsibility. The proper inquiry is whether command and
control is exercised effectively, and this is clearly an evidentiary issue.
Here, problems may arise when civilians are involved, as they may not have
a pre-established function in a well-defined hierarchy in which command
and control responsibilities are commensurate to rank. Civilians who are
placed in such roles may drift in and out of the decision making process,
raising questions about the permanence of their roles. In principle, how-
ever, command responsibility with military and paramilitary activity is the
same for all persons in command, whether or not they are part of the mili-
tary hierarchy. The difference is the legal and factual assumptions that
apply to military personnel who are a part of a chain of command.
B. Superior Responsibility
Those who are not a part of the military or subject to its control do not
fall under the command responsibility norms and standards, as just dis-
cussed. In this respect, the accelerated development of international law
through the ICTY and ICTR has affected the functional responsibility doc-
42. For a discussion of policy issues, see M. CHERIF BAssIOUNI & P. MANIKAS, THE
LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAvIA 345 (1996).
43. Garantenstellung is defined as an obligation to warrant a proper fulfillment of a
function.
44. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art.
7(3), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6(3), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter
ICTR Statue]; Rome Statute, supra note 12, art. 28(a)(ii), (b)(iii).
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trine with respect to civilians. Civilians can be held responsible for the
behavior of others when they are in a superior position to and able to con-
trol the behavior of the subordinate. Such superiors may work in a state
hierarchical structure, be politicians, or leaders of commercials enterprises
as well.
The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR clearly established criminal
responsibility for civilian superiors who act on a comparable footing with
military command responsibility. The common test is to apply the criteria
of knowledge or awareness; power or authority; and acceptance or negli-
gence. The case law deriving therefrom refined that accountability further
into a mature system of criminal responsibility, as reflected in the present
statute of the ICC. Those who have the ability to influence events through
their positions of superior authority should be brought to justice,45 as
responsibility may also arise by the virtue of a position of authority when
failing to prevent such crimes. 46 During the drafting process of the Rome
Statute, the point was raised whether civilian superior responsibility would
incur the same degree of responsibility as that of military commanders,
and whether civilian superiors would be in the same position as military
commanders to prevent or repress the commission of crimes by their sub-
ordinates and punish perpetrators. Article 28 of the Rome Statute
addresses the issue by separating both responsibilities in two different
paragraphs. The military paragraph provides for an extra test of "should-
have-known" and the civilian one without such test.
III. From Impunity to Accountability
Dictators and other "strong men" who negate the rule of law, and cre-
ate a platform for oppression, torture, or other violations of international
humanitarian law, are often either killed after a regime change, or negotiate
a way out and leave the country. Others secure their impunity through all
kinds of legal arrangements-sometimes of a constitutional nature-before
they step down. This is why national courts in South America have been
put on the sidelines for so many years, despite the fact that prosecutors
would have classically the competence to prosecute because of the national-
ity of the perpetrator or the locus delicti. The character of violations of
humanitarian law makes such crimes a universal matter, regardless nation-
ality and location. Consequently, individual responsibility for violations of
humanitarian law has become a global issue and the shift of focus from
state responsibility to individual responsibility would become meaningless
when individuals would hide away behind the sovereignty of the state. The
45. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Mladic, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61,
Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
1[ 41, 65, 74, 79, 81-83 (July 11, 1996). Karadzit, the President at the Bosnian Serb
Administration, and Mladic, the commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, were indicted
for violations of international humanitarian law committed by Bosnian Serb Administra-
tion forces.
46. Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Review of Indictment Pursuant to
Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 1 24 (Oct. 20, 1995).
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trend in international law is to rule out all barriers that would allow any
form of impunity for violations of humanitarian law. Indeed, times are
changing, and dictators will not escape liability as easily anymore.
A. Immunity
Historically, functional immunity of government leaders, ministers of
foreign affairs and heads of state has been firmly established in interna-
tional law, and reflected in international treaties such as the Vienna Con-
vention.4 7 For incumbent functionaries, the issue of immunity affects the
ratione personae, and, for former functionaries, the ratione materiae. It is
consistent that national courts should respect both kinds of immunities for
domestic crimes. The present international instruments, however, such as
the Vienna Convention, do not specifically address the responsibility of the
protected persons for violations of humanitarian law. Since international
crimes are no longer solely a matter for international or internationalized
courts, domestic courts may have to deal with the issue of immunities with
respect to international crimes as well. In the Pinochet case, 48 the Law
Lords denied immunity ratione materiae, as at the time of the extradition
request Pinochet was a former head of state. On an international level, the
Nuremberg Charter, the statutes of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL and the
Rome Statute deny any immunity. The scope on criminal responsibility for
violations of humanitarian law in international prosecutions is therefore
absolute, 49 in support of the principle that heinous crimes ought not to go
unpunished.
The immunity of acting dignitaries before a national court was an
issue in a dispute between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the King-
dom of Belgium, 50 which was litigated before the International Court of
Justice (ICJ). Belgian residents, most having Belgian nationality, filed
claims alleging war crimes and crimes against humanity in an ordinary
court in Brussels, which issued an arrest warrant for the incumbent Minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs of the Congo. The jurisdiction of the court was not
based on the principle of nationality or territoriality, as the alleged facts
were committed outside of Belgium, but on universal jurisdiction for seri-
ous violation of international humanitarian law. 5 1 The ICJ ruled that
Belgium had violated its legal obligations to respect the immunity from
47. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679.
48. See Pinochet, supra note 41.
49. The theoretical exception might be based on the age of the accused (i.e. exclud-
ing minors).
50. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (D.R.C. v. Belg.), 2002
I.CJ. 21 (Feb. 14) [hereinafter DRC].
51. The applicable provisions of Belgian Law are codified under the Law of 16 June
1993 "concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949 and of Protocols I and 11 of 8 June 1977 additional thereto"
as amended by Law of 19 February 1999 "concerning the Punishment of Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law." Article 7 provides that "[tihe Belgian courts
shall have jurisdiction in respect of the offences provided for in the present Law, where-
soever they may have been committed."
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criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability that the incumbent minister
enjoyed under international law. The court held that an incumbent minis-
ter for Foreign Affairs enjoys immunity and that the fact that the minister is
charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity did not constitute
an exception to that rule. The court observed that the immunity from
jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent ministers for Foreign Affairs does not
mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have
committed, irrespective of their gravity. The court then enumerated four
situations in which immunity and impunity do not go together: (a) Minis-
ters can be subject to proceedings in their own countries, when they do not
enjoy immunity under international law, (b) they can be tried by foreign
national courts if their own state waives their immunity, (c) when out of
office they will no longer enjoy immunity for acts committed prior or sub-
sequent to their period of office nor for acts committed in office tough in a
private capacity, and (d) they can be tried by certain international courts.
B. State Practice and International Cases
As indicated in the introduction of this article, leaders are inclined to
attack the authority to prosecute them, where possible. This is especially
true when the charges relate to violations of international humanitarian
law. Challenges were unsuccessful in the trials of Honneker, the former
leader of the German Democratic Republic and his successor Krenz,
52
before courts in Germany, as they were no longer in office at the time of
trial. General Pinochet, the former dictator of Chile, raised the issue of his
immunity in the extradition case 53 in the United Kingdom, but as men-
tioned above, failed for the same reason. Colonel Qadhafi was more suc-
cessful in pretrial proceedings before a French court with respect to his
alleged involvement of the bombing of an aircraft over Niger in September
1989, in which 170 persons, including French citizens, were killed. The
French Supreme Court reversed the approval to institute criminal investiga-
tions against Qadhafi because of his status as current Head of State of
Libya, and held that Qadhafi enjoyed immunity from criminal suit for that
reason.
54
Other examples include the decision of the French authorities to
arrest Ely Ould Dah, a Mauritanian colonel, for allegedly torturing sus-
pected coup plotters in his country in the early 1990's. 5 5 Similarly, when
Portuguese lawyers started seeking support to try Suharto, the former Pres-
ident of Indonesia, for the murder of thousands of civilians in East Timor;
his trip to Germany was cancelled. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, a high-ranking
official of Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq, made a cursory exit from
Austria when a complaint was filed for his alleged role in the mass murder
52. See supra notes 39 and 40.
53. See Pinochet, supra note 41.
54. Chambre Criminelle [Cass. Crim.] [Frech Supreme Court, Criminal Division]
Paris, Arret n' 1414, Mar. 13, 2001, Gaz. Pal. [20011, 2, somm.
55. See Terence Neilan, World Briefing: France, Maruitania: Military Freeze, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 1999, at A4.
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of Kurds in 1988.56 In July 2001, the IsraeliPrime Minister Sharon can-
celled a flight to Brussels because a lawsuit had been filed on the basis of
his alleged role in the massacre of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. In
1989, the United States invaded Panama, arrested de facto leader General
Manuel Noriega, and brought him to the United States to stand trial on
charges of racketeering, money laundering, and drug trafficking. In April
1992, he was convicted and sentenced to forty years in prison. Hissen
Habr6, the former president of Chad, was arrested on charges of mass-kill-
ings and torture by the Senegalese authorities. After a regime change, the
Senegal Supreme Court held that the Senegal courts lacked jurisdiction
and Habre was released in 2000.
5 7
The first senior state official prosecuted before an international tribu-
nal after Nuremberg58 was the former Prime Minister of Rwanda, Jean
Kambanda, for his role in the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994.
He entered a guilty plea, accepted the jurisdiction of the court, and was
convicted by the ICTR in 1998.
5 9
A year later, in 1999, the prosecutor of the ICTY indicted Slobodan
Milogevit while he was President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
60
After Milogevit had stepped down from office, 6 1 the new Yugoslav govern-
ment surrendered him to the ICTY in The Hague. At his initial appearance
before the Trial Chamber, Milogevit spoke to the judges of the ICTY, stat-
ing: "I consider this Tribunal a false Tribunal and the indictment a false indict-
ment . . . ." He later repeated this "famous" one-liner: "[this] is a false
Tribunal . . . an illegitimate one."'6 2 To rule out any misunderstanding,
Milogevit later filed a motion in which he unequivocally raised the issue of
his immunity, by arguing that "the Tribunal is illegal and lacks all jurisdic-
tion, including subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over his person
56. All three events were reported in World Briefing, WASH. PosT. Aug. 19, 1999, at
A13.
57. Cour de Cassation du Senegal (Premiere chambre statuant en matiere penale),
Aff. Habre, Arret n 14, Mar. 20, 2001.
58. The highest State official prosecuted before the Nuremberg Tribunal was Gros-
zadmiral Karl D6nitz, successor of Adolf Hitler for the period of 2 May 1945 to the
collapse of Nazi Germany. See TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNA-
TIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 78, 310, 315, 337 (1947).
59. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 4,
1998) (ICTR Trial Chamber). Later Kambanda revoked his plea, but in appeals the con-
viction was not reversed. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23, Judgment
(Oct. 19, 2000) (ICTR Appeals Chamber).
60. The ICTY Statute created personal jurisdiction for heads of states as well in arti-
cle 7(2) reading: "The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State
or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not prevent such person of
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment." ICTY Statute, supra note 44, art. 7(2).
The ICTR Statute has the same provision in article 6(2). ICTR Statute, supra note 44,
art. 6(2).
61. After the corrupt September elections, MilogeviC's downfall was a fact by 5 Octo-
ber 2000. See, e.g. Steven Erlanger, Showdown in Yugoslavia: Yugoslavs Claim Belgrade for
New Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2000, at Al.
62. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Transcript (uly 3, 2001), at p.2,
lines 3-6 and p.4, lines 1-3, available at http://www.un.org/icty/transe54/0107031A.
htm [hereinafter Transcript].
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and the indictment issued against him is void and a nullity."6 3 The reason-
ing for the argument demonstrates the way Milogevit operates, which is the
reason why it is quoted here in its entirety:
(1) The United Nations lacks authority and power under the Charter of the
United Nations and other instruments under which it was created to estab-
lish an international criminal court of any kind and especially one that is
selectively and politically limited in its powers and purposes as this tribunal
is limited but which claims power to compel the surrender of individuals by
sovereign nations and to try them for alleged crimes and if convicted to sen-
tence them to life in prison, that has no legal basis and violates fundamental
principles of international law.
(2) The Security Council has no authority or power to establish this Tribu-
nal both because the United Nations Charter confers no power on the Secur-
ity Council to do so and because the United Nations itself and the Security
Council lack inherent authority and power to do so as set forth above.
(3) The Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia corrupts justice and law
among nations and individuals or within the former nation that has been
targeted for Prosecution.
(4) By reason of the illegitimacy of its creation, the selective and political
nature of its powers and purposes as well the inherent and inescapable
weaknesses in structure, administration and operations of an ad hoc Tribu-
nal created as this one has created, the Tribunal lacks power and indepen-
dence and is incapable of protecting fundamental human rights and
providing due process of law and fundamental fairness in all of its functions
and operations, including without limitation, the issuance of indictments,
assuring access to all relevant evidence for both Prosecution and defence to
assure accuracy and truth in the fact finding process and fairness in the trial
of cases, and in the protection of witnesses and prisoners.
(5) The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the person of President
Milosevic because he was surrendered in violation of the constitution of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the constitution of the Republic of Serbia
and the Statute which created the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia.
6 4
The arguments related to the establishment of the ICTY echoed the
63. The motion, named "Preliminary Protective Motion" was filed on 9 August 2001.
Milogevit signed the motion and added in his own handwriting: "I submit this paragraf
[sic] 8 (eight) only. The preceding paragraphs are placed to explain the situation." [herein-
after Preliminary Protective Motion] Later Milogevic denied in a handwritten letter to
the Registrar of 24 August 2001 that he ever filed a motion, because the "paper dis-
patched to the Registrar on 9 August 2001" was no more than a reminder to the Registrar
of his obligation "to release Milogevie from prison immediately." On 16 August 2001, the
prosecution filed a response to the motion; the accused tried to table the issue at the
Status Conference of 30 August 2001 and filed a document "Presentation on the illegal-
ity of the so-called International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia" the same
day. The prosecution responded to this presentation on 13 September 2001; the amici
curiae filed a brief on jurisdiction on 19 October 2001 and finally the prosecution
responded to the amicus brief on 26 October 2001.
64. Preliminary Protective Motion, supra note 63, para. 8. The contents were further
elaborated and extended by Milo~evi in the document of 30 August 2001, "Presentation
on the illegality of the so-called International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via." See supra note 63.
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preliminary debate in the Tadit case 65 and ignored the case law developed
since then. 66 The amici curiae clarified a number of issues raised by the
accused-including immunity-and added a new element to the discussion
of jurisdiction. They suggested that the Trial Chamber should seek-either
through the ICTY, as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, or
through that council itself-an advisory opinion of the ICJ pursuant to arti-
cle 65 of the ICJ Statute and article 96 of the U.N. Charter on the issue of
jurisdiction. The Trial Chamber refused to seek an advisory opinion and
dismissed the claims of Milogevit in a robust decision 6 7 and that settled
the matter; the accused filed no appeal.
In 2003, the prosecutor of the SCSL indicted Charles Taylor, who was
at that time the president of the Republic of Liberia. Taylor, who was
abroad at the time, traveled back to Liberia when the SCSL issued an inter-
national arrest warrant. 68 The arrest warrant immobilized Taylor, and
Liberia was motivated to file a complaint against Sierra Leone with the
International Court of Justice for violating the immunity of its head of state
by Sierra Leone. Liberia, referring to the Case Concerning the Arrest War-
rant of 11 April 2000 before the ICJ, argued that the SCSL is not an interna-
tional court that would warrant an exception to the immunity of its
president.6 9 The SCSL was established by a negotiated agreement between
the government of Sierra Leone and the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, which was subsequently ratified by the parliament of Sierra
Leone, followed by the assent of the President of that state. The SCSL is a
part of the judicial authority operating within the Republic of Sierra Leone,
but it cannot impose legal obligations on states that are not a party to the
agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Nations. This in contrast
to international courts, such as the ICTY and ICTR, which were estab-
lished by the power of the U.N. Security Council acting under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter. Unlike the ICC-an international court established by
the majority of the members of the U.N. General Assembly-the SCSL Stat-
ute does not provide for the possibility of Security Council referral of a
situation for investigation, prosecution and trial to the SCSL. Whereas the
Republic of Sierra Leone did not accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ pursuant
to article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, the filing did not result in any litigation.
In 2003, Taylor filed-"under protest and without waiving of immunity"-a
motion with the Special Court for Sierra Leone to squash the indictment
65. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion on Juris-
diction (Aug. 10, 1995) (Trial Chamber I).
66. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defense Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995) (Appeals Chamber). See also Prosecutor
v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction
(June 18, 1997) (Trial Chamber); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44, Deci-
sion on the Defense Motion Pursuant to Rule 72 (Apr. 25, 2001) (Trial Chamber).
67. Prosecutor v, Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Decision on Preliminary Motions
(Nov. 8, 2001) (Trial Chamber I).
68. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-1-001, Indictment (Mar. 7, 2003);
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-0I-I-1003, Decision Approving Indictment and
Order for Non-Disclosure (Mar. 7, 2003).
69. See DRC, supra note 50.
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and declare the arrest warrant null and void. 70 As the motion raised the
issue of immunity, it was referred 71 to the Appeals Chamber, who issued
their decision on 31 May 2004.72 It is noted that Article 6(2) of the SCSL
Statute is taken verbatim from Article 6(2) of the ICTR Statute (which is the
same as article 7((2) of the ICTY Statute), 73 and provides for criminal
responsibility of heads of states. In its decision, the Appeals Chamber
inspects its own legal basis and status and argues that it was established by
an agreement between all members of the United Nations and Sierra
Leone, and that fact makes the agreement an expression of the will of the
international community. The judges conclude that circumstances sur-
rounding the establishment of the SCSL rendered it truly international.
That finding fit well with the ICJ ruling in the Congo-Belgium case, 74 and
consequently, the Appeals Chamber rejected Taylor's immunity claim and
dismissed the defense's motion. At this moment, Charles Taylor is in Nige-
ria because the president of that country granted him asylum. Nigeria may
possibly change its mind about sheltering Taylor-for example, after a
regime change-but for the time being, that country is a safe haven for
Taylor, especially because there is no extradition treaty between Sierra
Leone and Nigeria. As long as Taylor stays out of Sierra Leone and Nigeria
does not surrender him to the SCSL, he cannot be tried in absentia. 75 Con-
sequently, the case is still pending, awaiting the surrender of the
defendant.
It is very likely that Saddam Hussein will contest the competence of
the Iraqi Special Tribunal to try him, and attempt to invoke immunity for
acts during his presidency. His lawyers may elaborate on the Congo-
Belgium ruling of the ICJ, where the court held that state officials no
longer in office will not enjoy immunity for acts committed prior or subse-
quent to their period of office, nor for acts committed in office though in a
private capacity. 76 Moreover, they may well argue that the head of state is
immune under the Iraqi Constitution as it stood at the time, claiming the
present constitutional instruments77 null and void as being promulgated
70. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Defense Motion to quash the
Indictment Jul. 3, 2003). The Prosecution responded on 28 July 2003, and the Defense
replied on 30 July 2003.
71. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Referral (Sept. 19, 2003) (Trial
Chamber 1). The defense and the prosecution filed further submission on 1 October
2003, 14 October 2003 and 11 November 2003. Amici curiae briefs were filed on 23
and 28 October 2003. After hearings on 31 October and 1 November, post-hearing sub-
missions were filed on 12 and 21 November 2003.
72. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004).
73. See ICTR Statute, supra note 60, art: 6(2).
74. See DRC, supra note 50.
75. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 17(4)(d), Aug. 14, 2000,
U.N. Doc. 5/2002/246 (providing that the accused is entitled-as a minimum guaran-
tee-to be tried in his presence).
76. See DRC, supra note 50.
77. For example, the Iraq Interim Constitution of 2004, established by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), contains provisions confirming the Iraqi Special Tribunal
Statute and its jurisdiction and penalties in Article 48; in addition, Article 26 the Consti-
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by foreign occupational powers in violation of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion 78 or by an illegal government. However, as the Iraqi Special Tribunal
Statute ("IST Statute") compels it to recognize international standards in
applying Iraqi law, the judges will recognize the international trend-
affirmed in above-mentioned case law-to rule out all barriers that would
allow any form of impunity for violations of international humanitarian
law. Moreover, the IST is a national court with Iraqi judges who are aware
that new democratic Iraq must come to terms with the gruesome history of
the Saddam Hussein regime. For all these reason, it seems that a defense of
immunity is unlikely to succeed.
IV. Trial Issues
Defense counsels do not like uncertainties. So the first thing they do
is analyze the procedural system at hand in order to be sure they under-
stand all aspects of it; discover the loopholes; find the best routes; and
avoid dead legal alleys. In domestic cases, this is not a serious issue
because it is usually a learning process at the start of a legal career. When
accepting a case before an international (or internationalized) court,
defense counsel will be confronted with procedural law he is not familiar
with. In most cases, the procedural law reflects a novel system, which is an
amalgam of elements of accusatory and inquisitory legal systems. On their
face, most of these trials may look like common law trials, but on a number
of issues they are not. There is no jury, and therefore the role of the judge
is different: they are engaged with "establishing the truth," as they have to
judge the heart of the matter-is the accused guilty or not. The judges
consequently take an active part in the proceedings; are not driven by the
parties, but direct the format and the extent of the trial; control the number
of witnesses; examine them to a certain extent; accept hearsay, let evidence
and exhibits come in; and rule about matters of admissibility later. In sum,
the way evidence is processed differs from the usual trial experiences in an
Anglo-Saxon setting.
A. Legal Representation, the Milogevit Trial
Heads of state and other people in powerful positions are used to run-
ning their affairs the way they want. Powerful people in countries without a
proper functioning democracy-those in totalitarian systems-are not used
to being subjected to the power of others. Warlords, chiefs, and dictators
in these circumstances develop an attitude that underscores the "survival
tution provides that the law of the CPA will remain in effect until it is rescinded or
amended. AL-DUSTER AL-Mo'&AKT [Interim Constitution] (2004) (Iraq), available at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html.
78. See Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War arts. 64-68, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 74 U.N.T.S.
287; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 43, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277 (embodying the limitations that the international law of occupation
places on the authority of an occupying power, especially with respect to political and
legal institutions of the state).
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of the fittest." There is no reason to believe their reactions will be different
when they are prosecuted. One challenge Hussein faces is the temptation
to either to defend himself without the assistance of defense counsel or,
when accepting such assistance, to disregard professional advice and, in
fact, try to run the defense. Experiences of this kind are not encouraging,
as can be observed in the Milogevit and Seselj cases. 7 9 Both defendants
refused any legal representation and pester the proceedings.
Milogevit told the Trial Chamber at his initial appearance, as quoted,
that he considered the tribunal to be illegal, and concluded "so I have no
need to appoint counsel to illegal organ."8 0 This changed the usual scenario
and the judges had to consider what the consequences of the attitude
might be. Trial procedures are usually composed on a balanced mix of the
responsibility of the judges for an expeditious and fair trial, and the com-
petent performance of staff, prosecutors and defense counsel. All systems
are vulnerable to imbalances when one of the participants malfunctions.
The refusal of Milogevit to accept any form of legal representation and his
firm wish to defend himself in person increased risk of error during the
trial. The judges decided, in the interest of securing a fair trial, to appoint
three counsels to appear before the court as amicus curiae to assist the
Trial Chamber. The judges charged the amici with the duty of making any
available submission or objection; and of cross-examining witnesses; draw-
ing the attention to any (self) defenses; exculpatory of mitigating evidence;
and any other action required in order to secure a fair trial, including iden-
tifying witnesses whom the Trial Chamber may itself wish to call.8 '
Miloevit's reaction to the appointment was ambivalent, as he may have
appreciated the advantages of being assisted without being responsible for
it. On the other hand, the amici's duty to cross-examine witnesses would
limit his room to maneuver, unless he conferred with them about concep-
tual and strategic issues. In any case, Milogevit decided not to communi-
cate with the amici, as he may have thought it would allow him to be
consistently "politically correct. ''8 2 The pattern over the years consists of
the neutral ignorance of the amici, contrasted with Milogevit's persistent
attacks on the prosecution, and the occasional dismay of the judges.
At the first Status Conference in August 2001, the prosecution sug-
gested that the court assign a defense counsel for the accused, in addition
to the amicus curiae. The Trial Chamber rejected this proposal, stating
that the accused has a right to counsel, but he also has a right not to have
counsel. A few months after the beginning of the trial, 83 Milo~evit identi-
fied the lawyers Zdenko Tomanovic and Dragoslav Ognjanovic as associ-
ates with whom he wished to communicate. The judges accepted that it
79. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67. In 2005 alone, the Trial Chamber had
issued seventeen decisions in response to motions by the accused.
80. See Transcript, supra note 62, at 2, line 5.
81. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Order (Aug. 30, 2001; amended Oct.
30, 2001 & Jan. 11, 2002) (Trial Chamber I).
82. Milogevit may also have considered the fact that videotapes of the hearings were
broadcast in the former Yugoslavia, offering a platform for political views.
83. The Trial began on 14 February 2002.
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would be in the interest of a fair trial for the accused to meet with and be
able to communicate freely with persons for legal advice, and to be able to
discuss and supply them with copies of documents subject to non-disclo-
sure to third parties.8 4 This assistance improved Milogevit's professional
performance in the courtroom.
But by the end of that year, the prosecution raised the issue again and
moved for assignment of counsel to the accused. 85 Milogevit accused the
prosecution of "trying to take away my right to speak here." When the Trial
Chamber asked whether it would not be sensible for his legal associates to
sit in court and assist him, he replied that he did not need his legal associ-
ates with him in court. The amici curiae pointed out that a mandatory
provision of defense counsel is drawn from inquisitorial systems, where the
functions of defense counsel in a trial are very different from those in the
adversarial form of trial adopted at the ICTY. For instance, the obligation
of "putting a case"-which is required of the defense in the adversarial sys-
tem-is impossible for an advocate to achieve without instructions from the
accused as to the nature of the defense. The Trial Chamber agreed with this
view and rejected the motion.8 6 The judges found a concurring opinion in
the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, which con-
cerned the question of whether a defendant in a state criminal trial has a
right, under the U.S. Constitution, to proceed without counsel when he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. 8 7
84. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Order (Apr. 16, 2002) (Trial
Chamber).
85. Prosecutor v, Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Submission from the Office of the
Prosecutor on the Future Conduct of the Case in the Light of the State of the Accused's
Health and the Length and Complexity of the Case (Nov. 8, 2002) (proposing that the
Trial Chamber appoint defence counsel for the accused).
86. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Decision on the Prosecution Motion
Concerning Assignment of Counsel (Apr. 4, 2003) (Trial Chamber 1).
87. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The U.S. Supreme Court noted that:
This Court's past recognition of the right of self-representation, the federal-court
authority holding the right to be of constitutional dimension, and the state con-
stitutions pointing to the right's fundamental nature form a consensus not eas-
ily ignored.... We confront here a nearly universal conviction, on the part of
our people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defen-
dant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.
Id. at 817. The Court found that:
The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like
the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a will-
ing defendant-not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defen-
dant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the
accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment.
In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master, and the right to make a
defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment
insists.
Id. at 819. The Court thus concluded that the Sixth Amendment, when naturally read,
implies a right of self-representation, and noted that this reading is reinforced by the
Amendment's roots in English legal history. The Court noted that with the exception of
the practice of the Star Chamber, the right to self-representation in England predates the
right to legal counsel in serious crime cases. Id. at 821. The Supreme Court also said:
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There are also practical reasons for not appointing defense counsel to
Milogevit. If such counsel were appointed, the Trial Chamber would have
to take one of two courses: should Milogevit refuse to instruct him or her,
the Trial Chamber could either: (a) not allow Milogevit to make submis-
sions and question witnesses, thereby effectively preventing him from put-
ting forward any defense; or, (b) it could allow him to make submissions
and question witnesses, in which case, the defense counsel could do no
more than the amici curiae.
One month later, Trial Chamber 11 in Seselj took a different route.
These judges appointed standby counsel to assist Seselj in the preparation
of his case for trial; to be present in the court room; to address the court
whenever so requested by Seselj; and to put questions to witnesses if so
ordered by the Trial Chamber, without depriving Seselj of his right to con-
trol the content of the examination. In addition, counsel would take over
the defense from Seselj at trial, if the judges found that he was engaging in
disruptive conduct.88 The judges noted that in the Barayagwiza proceed-
ings,89 the Trial Chamber of the ICTR had appointed standby counsel after
the accused had merely boycotted the trial and obstructed the course of
justice. The composition of the Trial Chamber II in the Seselj case differed
from the composition of the Trial Chamber I in the Milogevie case. Trial
Chamber I had stronger roots in common law jurisdictions, and had put
greater emphasis on the interests of the accused than the character of the
proceedings. Trial Chamber II had more ties with civil law jurisdictions:
one reason why these judges took more guiding from European continental
case law and put more emphasis on the interests of justice.
In February 2004, the prosecution's case came to an end, resulting in a
scheduling order for Milogevit to begin the defense's case in June 2004.90
This caused some opposition from Milogevi, who requested more time for
preparation because of his illness. From this point on, the Trial Chamber-
whose composition had changed after the sudden death of the presiding
judge Sir Richard May-departed from its previous policy and ordered the
prosecution to file submissions on the role of assigned counsel. 9 1 The
judges were to accept a different course, as they indeed did in September
It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better
defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. But where
the defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the poten-
tial advantage of a lawyer's training and experience can be realized, if at all, only
imperfectly. To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that
the law contrives against him.
Id. at 834.
88. Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for
Order appointing Counsel to assist Voislav Seselj with his defense (May 9, 2003) (Trial
Chamber II).
89. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision on Defense Counsel
Motion to Withdraw (Nov. 2, 2000) (Trial Chamber).
90. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Decision on the Completion of the
Prosecution Case (Feb. 25, 2004) (Trial Chamber I).
91. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Further Order on Future Conduct of
the Trial (uly 19, 2004) (Trial Chamber 1).
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2004, by assigning counsel to Milogevit. 9 2 The primary reason for this
change of heart was clearly the weak health of Miloevit, and the disruptive
effect of his illness on the course of the trial, as well as the fear that it
would cripple the fairness of the trial itself. One of the amici accepted the
appointment but Milogevit opposed it furiously; it resulted in pandemo-
nium. After assigned counsel appealed the decision of the Trial Chamber,
and Milogevit filed a disciplinary complaint against counsel, the Trial
Chamber had to reverse the order of cross-examination. However, the
Appeals Chamber dismissed the assigned counsel's appeal, and denied his
request to be relieved of his duties. The present situation is curious as
Milogevit does not communicate with counsel; counsel is not instructed;
and Milogevit wants to cross-examine witnesses himself. The assignment
of counsel did not, in fact, improve the situation; on the contrary, it seemed
the performance of an amicus curiae could not compensate for the mal-
functioning of the role of the defence.
The Milogevit trial seems to linger on since it started more than three
years ago. There a number of reasons for this snail's pace. An important
factor is, of course, the weak health of the accused. As Milogevit wants to
defend himself, hearings must be adjourned when he is ill. This situation
has not been effectively remedied by the assignment of counsel to him.
Secondly, the prosecution's desire to have the three indictments joined has
slowed the proceeding down. The prosecution has spent too much time on
matters of crime base rather than criminal responsibility, although that
changed for better in a later stage of the prosecution's case. The judges had
to cut down vast numbers of witness on both sides. 93 The examination of
witnesses is very time consuming as Milogevit insists on cross-examining
every witness himself. It took some time for Milogevit's examination skills
to improve. The amici have taken a part in cross-examinations as well.
Finally, too much time is spent on technical issues related to issues of legal
representation.
B. Expectations, the Saddam Hussein Trial
The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
9 4
authorized the Governing Council to establish an Iraqi Special Tribunal. 9 5
Acting upon this delegation, the Governing Council established the IST
92. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Reasons for Decision on Assignment
of Defense Counsel (Sept. 22, 2004) (Trial chamber I).
93. Prosecution indicated initially almost 1000 witnesses, Milogevit released the
names of 1631 people he wants to call as witnesses.
94. Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 1, § 1(1) and 1(2), stipu-
lated that "[t]he CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily..." over Iraq and
that the CPA Administrator shall exercise the authority. Coalition Provisional Authority,
Iraq, Regulation No. 1 (May 16, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regula-
tions/20030516_CPAREG_1 The CoalitionProvisionalAuthority_.pdf. Paul Bremer
Ill was appointed to be the CPA Administrator.
95. Paul Bremer, III, Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, Order No.
48, Delegation of Authority Regarding Establishment of an Iraqi Special Tribunal (Dec.
10, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD
48_IST-and.AppendixA.pdf [hereinafter Order 48].
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and issued its Statute, to become effective on 10 December 2001. The IST
Statute stipulates that the Baghdadi Criminal Code of 1919, the Iraqi Crim-
inal Code of 1969, and the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedural Law of 1971
are applicable. The substantive crimes under the tribunal's jurisdiction are
laid down in a document called "The elements of the Crimes." The IST
Statute mandates that the president of the tribunal draft the rules of proce-
dure and evidence to be adopted by the majority of the permanent judges
of the tribunal.96 The mandate provides only general guidance, suggesting
that the rules should address the conduct of the pretrial phase of the pro-
ceedings; trials and appeals; the administration of evidence; the protection
of victims and witnesses; and other appropriate matters where applicable
law, including the IST Statute, does not or does not provide for a specific
situation. The Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedural Law of 1971 should
guide the judges. This might be a problem as the Iraqi legal system has a
Franco-Egyptian background from the Ottoman era that was adapted by
the British during the Mandate period. After independence, the Ba'ath
regime planned to adopt the old accusatory model, but, in fact, the judicial
system fell into disrepair and disrepute.
This background shaped Iraqi law into a system that resembles more
of the civil law tradition than anything else. The present draft of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence of the IST is clearly designed by lawyers from a
common law tradition and contrasts the civil law tradition in Iraqi proceed-
ings. The current draft is lapidary and it would not be possible to run
trials on basis of the rules only. Where the draft rules are silent on specific
issues, it might be problematic to amend the draft rules with provisions of
the Code of Criminal Procedure because both systems are not compatible.
An investigative judge in the civil tradition, for example, functions within a
clear division of the role and powers of that magistrate and the role and
powers of the prosecutor. Under the present version of the rules, it appears
that the investigative magistrate will draft the charges for the prosecutor to
use in the indictment. The draft rules to the Code of Criminal Procedure
also contain inconsistent provisions that may cause confusion about com-
petences: for example, when the rules for disclosure are applied in a file
system.
Will the trial of Saddam Hussein start this year or next year? Little is
known about the planning of the IST. The IST has not yet issued formal
indictments with specific charges of Saddam and his lieutenants, which is
consistent with the inquisitory tradition. There are preliminary charges to
be reviewed by the investigative magistrate and to be used for pretrial inves-
tigations. It is expected that the charges will encompass killings of political
leaders and religious figures in the past thirty-five years,9 7 including the
killings of Kurds in period between 1983 and 1988, and the Shiites in
96. Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 16, Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231,
reprinted in Order 48, supra note 95, at app. 1, available at http://iraq-ist.org/en/about/
statute.htm.
97. The Iraqi Special Tribunal has a temporal jurisdiction over the period of 17 July
1968 to 1 May 2003. Id. art. 1.
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1991. Saddam Hussein appeared before an investigative judge, who
informed him of the pretrial charges. This magistrate is also the competent
authority to deal with matters of pretrial custody. The broadcasting of that
appearance on TV may have confused the public at large, as it appears not
everyone understood the procedure. This reminds us of the importance of
proper public relations: not only should justice be done, but the public
should also perceive that justice was done.
Reports suggest that Saddam Hussein's defense will be based broadly
on two principles. This first one is the claim of that the tribunal itself is
illegitimate, because it was put in place by an illegal government after an
"illegal" invasion. 98 Playing the "immunity card," as discussed above, may
top this defense. This issue might be addressed if the newly elected Iraqi
Government either reestablishes the tribunal, or, at last, reenacts the IST
Statute. The second defense might be the argument that trials before a
domestic court with Iraqi judges cannot be fair. This resembles defenses
heard by European courts trying their "Quislings" after the Second World
War. Indeed, fairness might raise concerns, because Iraqi judges suffered
under the Hussein regime. It is not unrealistic to suppose some bias.
Another concern is related to the limited possibilities of a domestic court
to guarantee the accused a full defense, such as the opportunity to call all
relevant witnesses. Would the tribunal allow Saddam Hussein to call the
foreign witness and what powers would the tribunal have to make these
witnesses to show up in court? More generally, will the investigative magis-
trates be able to effectively investigate crimes that happened so long ago?
Will there be any Iraqis who would dare to give evidence at the request of
Saddam? These are the types of serious issues that led the international
community to establish the ICTY and ICTR with powers deriving form the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Conclusion
The wave of accountability is gathering strength, but it is too early to
draw conclusions from the present experiences. The Milogevit trial is at
the halfway point; the Saddam Hussein trial has not started. It is not
unreasonable to expect that the problems of the Milogevk trial may haunt
the Saddam Hussein trial as well. The difference is that the ICTY does not
suffer from "quantity or quality" problems. The lesson to learn here is that
the Iraqi Special Tribunal will need all the international assistance it can
get.
98. See, e.g., supra notes 80, 92, and 93, and accompanying text.

